Stay informed about our latest news,
publications, & uploads:
Key
Takeaways
-
South
Korea and Japan have made historic strides in bilateral relations under
President Lee, with the first joint statement in 17 years and enhanced
trilateral cooperation with the U.S.
-
To
sustain momentum, both countries should institutionalize cooperation through
security and economic “2+2” meetings, military exchanges, and joint initiatives
addressing shared domestic and industrial challenges.
-
Expanding
civil and private sector engagement—including youth programs, cultural
exchanges, and corporate partnerships—can strengthen resilience and create a
future-oriented, practical partnership beyond political fluctuations.
Japanese Prime Minister Shigeru
Ishiba announced his resignation on September 8,
putting a hold on recent momentum to strengthen the South Korea-Japan
relationship after a symbolic summit with President Lee Jae-myung in August.
Earlier this year, the main concern in the bilateral relationship was
whether Lee would emulate the conciliatory approach to Japan like his
predecessor Yoon Suk-yeol, or a more standoffish approach similar to Moon
Jae-in. Now, the concern lies in Tokyo, where the new prime minister could continue
building on the last two successive prime ministers’ work or abandon the
positive path toward a stronger South Korea-Japan partnership.
Changes in governments have
historically halted and soured bilateral relations between the two countries.
But instead of taking a more cautious approach, the uncertainty in
international affairs requires the two countries to continue deepening
cooperation.
To elevate bilateral relations to a
new stage, South Korea and Japan should commit to a future-oriented
relationship not just symbolically — like with talks of updating the 1998 joint declaration — but a
practical agenda that outlines steps to achieve cooperation in areas of common
interest.
Despite the initial concerns over
President Lee’s perceived anti-Japan stance inferred from his past remarks, his
first 100 days in office, when it comes to ROK-Japan relations, proved to be a
relatively positive surprise.
First, two meetings between the two leaders have established
the basic foundation for continued cooperation: one during the G7 Summit in June and an official bilateral
summit in August. The August summit marked Lee’s first state visit since his
inauguration and produced a joint statement — the first in 17 years between
leaders of the two countries — encompassing cooperation across regional
security, people-to-people exchange, future industries, and global
partnerships. The timing of the summit, scheduled immediately before Lee’s
state visit to the United States, along with the two leaders’ shared
perceptions on critical regional and domestic issues, signaled how both
capitals recognize each other’s strategic importance in their respective
diplomatic frameworks.
Second, substantive meetings and
dialogues beyond the symbolic summitry have followed to create meaningful
developments and carry this momentum. The Defense Ministers’
Meeting
on September 8 — marking the first visit by a Japanese defense minister to
Seoul in a decade — reaffirmed commitments to denuclearize the Korean
peninsula, deepen trilateral cooperation, and expand partnerships in emerging
technologies and new frontiers including space, artificial intelligence, and
autonomous weapons systems.
Trilateral cooperation with the
United States appears to have maintained its momentum, at least for now, with
both Seoul and Tokyo consistently emphasizing its strategic importance through
high-level engagements, including meetings between foreign ministers, deputy and vice
foreign ministers, Joint Chiefs of Staff (Tri-CHOD), as well as expanded and
continued working-level cooperation on quantum industrial
security
and North Korea’s
escalating cybersecurity threats.
Reframing bilateral relations as a
“future-oriented partnership” will not be easy. Decades of mistrust and
instances of high tension have left a visible mark on the bilateral
relationship.
Yet, the list of shared challenges
continues to grow, from China’s actions to assert itself in the Indo-Pacific
region to uncertainty over U.S. commitment to the region to socioeconomic
issues like depopulation. There are several streams of effort that the two
countries can take to move from the past and carry the present momentum into
the future.
First, a shift in mindsets on both
sides must take place. For far too long, both South Korea and Japan have come
to expect bilateral relations to come in fits and starts. A culture of
continuity must be fostered in a way that moves beyond political narratives and
mutual distrust every time a new leader enters the fray in either country. For
instance, despite lingering concerns over the consistency of South Korea’s
Japan policy, Lee has proven thus far that he practices what he preaches:
practical diplomacy that requires stronger relations to be built with Japan.
Japan’s new leader — whether that be the moderate leaning Shinjiro
Koizumi or conservative Sanae Takaichi or someone else — should also be given
the benefit of the doubt to take time to assess the value of the bilateral
relationship. Domestic political narratives quickly jump to the conclusion that
seeking closer ties with the other country represents weakness or a lack of
appreciation for past grievances. This narrative has to shift to one in which
bilateral relations are viewed as a strategic asset in an uncertain world
rather than a liability.
Second, the two countries should
institutionalize areas of cooperation and set a realistic roadmap for how to
practically deepen cooperation. A huge step that would indicate the fundamental
redrawing of relations would be to set up a security consultative committee
(2+2) and an economic “2+2” meeting between relevant ministers, which Japan
conducts with important allies and partners. These forums can serve as a
high-level dialogue to discuss anything from defense industry cooperation to
supply chain resilience to sharing information on common regional challenges.
This would elevate the ad hoc “2+2” between senior foreign and defense ministry
officials last held in 2023.
The two countries can also explore
avenues for military-to-military cooperation, something that has been kept off
the table in defense talks given diverging strategic focus points (Korean
Peninsula vs. East China Sea). While mutual defense minister visits and routine
senior official dialogues are important, the two countries could pursue
unit-level exchanges to understand the situations each country faces in their
respective backyards and to promote trust building without immediately jumping
into sensitive areas like joint contingency planning or signing a reciprocal
access agreement.
Other areas of cooperation should be
strengthened too, such as addressing shared domestic challenges like
demographic decline and regional revitalization by doubling down on knowledge
sharing and pursuing joint projects. The next step after creating institutions
would be to secure constant communication and design research projects or
create financial incentives for businesses to invest in rural areas in both
countries.
Third, civil engagement between the
two countries must not only continue but expand. The record-high numbers for
tourist exchanges last year, driven particularly by a surge of Korean visitors
to Japan, have certainly contributed to the warmer public perceptions of each
other. A joint survey by Yomiuri
Shimbun and Hankuk Ilbo in June revealed that the majority of both Korean and
Japanese respondents believe their nations enjoy good bilateral relations,
while approximately 40 percent expressed cultural favorability. The Hankuk Research’s July survey on neighboring countries also
recorded the highest-ever favorability rating for Japan (42.7 percent) in the
survey’s history. In both studies, citizens between 18 and 29 who have greater
cultural exposure to one another and lesser historical memories reported the
highest favorability among all age groups.
This cultural asset should be
translated into policy actions and sustained dialogues. Beyond mere cultural
exchanges, both governments and NGOs should promote policy and educational
engagements between the youth of both countries in order to foster the mutual
understanding of bilateral relationship’s importance and nurture a
future-oriented mindset focused on cooperation rather than divisions. The area
of exchanges should also cover broader common domestic challenges and
industrial objectives, such as talent development in strategic industries such
as artificial intelligence and quantum technology through joint educational and
research-oriented initiatives. When such collaborative habits and conversations
take place, more sensitive topics that have historically strained the bilateral
relationships, including historical disputes, can be addressed more naturally
and with less political burden.
Seoul and Tokyo must remember how
swiftly and dramatically public perceptions deteriorated during the 2019 trade dispute
stemming from disagreements over forced labor compensation. Civil engagements
and the underlying rapport between societies form a foundation that will keep
the two countries close even when tested by domestic and foreign pressures –
preventing disagreements from escalating into lasting divisions. Hence, both
leaders would be wise to capitalize on the current momentum to foster deeper
and more resilient engagements.
Lastly, private sector engagement
must be elevated as a cornerstone of the bilateral relations, with governments
promoting and supporting dialogue and cooperation between corporations
navigating similar external environments, such as U.S. pressures and the need
for technological innovation in an increasingly competitive global landscape.
Both governments could strategically
encourage wider collaborations between corporates through joint ventures and
similar initiatives, especially given how Korean and Japanese companies face
parallel challenges with the new U.S. investment packages and supply chain
diversification requirements following America’s reshoring strategy. The
partnerships between companies could certainly leverage complementary strengths
while sharing risks in the third-country markets, mutually benefiting from
their expertise and capital. The LG Energy
Solutions-Toyota Tsusho joint venture in North Carolina exemplifies this approach,
highlighting how strategic partnerships can simultaneously address external
policy pressures for domestic production while maintaining competitiveness in
critical sectors like electric vehicle batteries.
Simultaneously, this effort should
be accompanied by expanded dialogue between business leaders via
institutionalized regular conferences, high-level delegations led by
organizations such as Keidanren and KCCI, and government-facilitated forums.
Existing programs like the Korea-Japan Business
Conference
that have proved effective in promoting cooperation should be sustained and
even expanded to include a broader range of companies from diverse industries
and scales of operations. Such systematic engagement creates resilient economic
foundations that can withstand political fluctuations and provide practical
incentives for continued cooperation.
The 1998 joint declaration by
President Kim Dae-jung and Prime Minister Keizo Obuchi dramatically developed
Korea-Japan relations, providing a blueprint for comprehensive future-oriented
partnerships rooted in historical reconciliation and shared international
objectives. Two decades later, this landmark declaration remains the gold
standard, with successive leaders — from former President Yoon Suk Yeol's
ambitious upgrade initiatives to President Lee’s explicit reference to the 1998
framework — consistently returning to its foundational principles. But now is
the time for the bold upgrade of these principles.
If Kim and Obuchi showcased the
vision to revolutionize bilateral relations in 1998, today’s leaders face an
even more compelling imperative to elevate this partnership for the challenges
ahead. For this to happen, both nations must move beyond the counterproductive
cycle of worrying about new leadership causing disruptions, but focus instead
on a positive agenda addressing what must be accomplished given the rapidly
shifting regional and global environment. The foundation laid a quarter-century
ago now requires structural reinforcement to withstand the pressures and
opportunities of our current era.
Rintaro Nishimura is a Senior Associate in The Asia Group’s Japan practice, where he researches and analyzes domestic political shifts, foreign and defense policy, economic and energy security, and technology policy developments. He has extensive writing experience, with publications in the Georgetown Journal of Asian Affairs, Nikkei Asia, The Diplomat, The National Interest, Tokyo Review, Asia Tech Observer, Global Asia, The Japan Times, and The Korea Times. Jinwan Park is a Nonresident Fellow at the European Centre for North Korean Studies at the University of Vienna and a former Schwarzman Scholar at Tsinghua University. A regular columnist for The Korea Times, his research focuses on Korean domestic and foreign policy, public opinion, and East Asian relations. His writing has appeared in The Hill, Nikkei Asia, South China Morning Post, as well as in publications by think tanks, including the Center for Strategic and International Studies, Council on Foreign Relations, and the Chicago Council on Global Affairs. Both also serve as Co-Founders of the U.S.–ROK–Japan Trilateral Next-Gen Study Group, a network of 40 young professionals dedicated to sustaining dialogue and strengthening cooperation among the three countries. Both also serve as Co-Founders of the U.S.–ROK–Japan Trilateral Next-Gen Study Group, a network of 40 young professionals dedicated to sustaining dialogue and strengthening cooperation among the three countries.