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Key Takeaways
- The U.S. immigration raid on Korean plants in Georgia exposed deep flaws in the visa system, which fails to accommodate Korean companies’ need for skilled workers, leading to reliance on informal labor practices and straining the Korea–U.S. alliance.
- The raid reflects broader shifts in the global economic order, where the Trump administration’s policies link trade, investment, and immigration control to protect domestic manufacturing and satisfy its working-class base.
- Korea must work with the U.S. to reform
visa systems and establish institutional mechanisms — potentially linking visas
to investment or expanding programs like the APEC Business Travel Card — to
ensure stable labor mobility and safeguard future cooperation.
U.S. Immigration Raid on Korean Plants
in Georgia
In September 2025, an unprecedented
immigration raid unfolded at a Korean plant in Georgia, resulting in more than
300 Korean nationals being arrested and detained by U.S. Immigration and
Customs Enforcement (ICE). Although most of the detainees were brought home
within two weeks thanks to the Korean government’s swift response, the incident
caused serious disruptions to the overseas construction projects of the
affected Korean companies. The Korea–U.S. relationship was also put to the test
by this event.
There had indeed been a practice of Korean
companies dispatching employees to the U.S. through informal or even illegal
means. It is challenging for Korean companies to hire American workers with the
necessary skills for local plant construction and operations at reasonable
wages. Sending Korean workers instead, however, also faces institutional
barriers. While large corporations can sometimes secure E-2 (Treaty Investor
and employee) or L-1 (Intracompany Transferee) visas for executives or senior
engineers, it is extremely difficult for short-term personnel from
subcontracting companies to obtain proper visas. As a result, many Korean firms
have resorted to sending Koreans who enter the U.S. on short-term business
visas (B-1) or under the Visa Waiver Program (ESTA). Although this practice
arose because the U.S. work-visa system does not fully reflect corporate labor
needs, the risk of these employees falling into illegal status remained
unresolved.
Despite this, the recent U.S. immigration
raid is still an unjustifiable overreach that disregards the long-standing
alliance between Korea and the U.S. Among the over 300 detainees, some
individuals were staying in the U.S. with legitimate visas. Moreover, the
random and inhumane arrests and detentions of Korean nationals cannot be
justified under any circumstances. Furthermore, foreign investment in the U.S.
will inevitably be discouraged if companies cannot secure the skilled workers
they need. Georgia had become a focal point for Korean automakers’ large-scale
investments in the U.S. The immigration raid not only shook investor confidence
but also caused serious delays in factory construction and operations. Above
all, this incident revealed a lack of respect for the Korea–U.S. alliance. Such
actions risk undermining decades of mutual trust and cooperation built on
shared democratic values and economic partnership.
It must also be recognized that there have
been very few legitimate legal pathways for Korean firms to send skilled
workers to the U.S., as described above. These institutional shortcomings have
been filled by informal practices, which cannot be characterized as deliberate
wrongdoing. If the U.S. seeks to correct these practices, it must first
establish a proper institutional framework to support lawful labor mobility
rather than arresting Korean workers.
Changing Global Economic Order as the
Background of the Immigration Raid
Trump’s decision to target Korean (or any
foreign) workers is closely tied to recent shifts in the global economic
landscape. The interaction between trade, investment, labor, and immigration is
rewriting the old rules of free trade.
The starting point is trade. Since China
emerged as the world’s factory in the 1990s, U.S. manufacturing jobs have
rapidly declined. Free-trade economists believed that workers displaced by
import competition would relocate to other regions or industries and earn
higher incomes. However, MIT economist David Autor and his co-authors refuted
this idea through empirical analysis. Regions more exposed to Chinese import
competition suffered greater economic harm, and manufacturing workers in those
areas failed to move into higher-value industries, experiencing lasting income
losses.[1] The
authors called this phenomenon the “China Shock.”
n a more recent study, the same authors
added immigration to the context. The initial employment shock from import
competition was mostly offset by the mid-2010s as non-manufacturing jobs
rebounded. However, this recovery mainly benefited newly arrived, higher-educated
immigrants rather than native-born white workers.[2] Immigrant
entry into the labor market suppressed wage growth for low-skilled native
workers. The white working class was among the groups that experienced the
greatest compounded shock — trade losses amplified by immigration.
The Trump administration’s attempt to
address this challenge consists of two elements. The first is tariff
imposition. Regardless of their effectiveness, reducing trade itself is a
natural political reaction aimed at reversing manufacturing job losses. The
U.S. began to impose a unilateral “reciprocal tariff” on August 7, 2025, with
tariff rates determined through negotiations with dozens of countries. Jamieson
Greer, the U.S. Trade Representative, referred to this series of negotiations
as the “Trump Round”
in his New York Times essay titled “Why We Remade the Global Order.”[3] Moreover,
tariffs have increasingly become intertwined with a wide range of issues — from
foreign investment and national security to the promotion of American-made
products. In its drive to protect domestic manufacturing, the administration
has shown a willingness to sacrifice some price stability and even economic
growth.
Yet trade policy alone is not sufficient.
As long as immigrants continue to enter, the economic situation of Trump’s
working-class base cannot improve. His second prescription enters here:
restricting immigration. The first targets are undocumented immigrants. Sectors
such as agriculture and construction depend heavily on them, with about 15% of
the total workforce in those industries. From Trump’s perspective, a
large-scale immigration crackdown both enforces the law and satisfies his core
supporters. Also, if the massive foreign investment he secured through trade
negotiations fails to translate into domestic job creation, his administration
risks losing face. The current immigration enforcement, therefore, should be
seen as a strong warning: “If you invest in America, you must hire Americans.”
The Remaining Task of the Korean
Government
The Korean government managed to
repatriate the detained workers swiftly, but larger challenges remain. The
immediate priority is to support proper visa issuance for Korean companies that
have invested in the U.S., especially taking extra care of subcontractors who
were hit the hardest this time. In parallel, the Korean government should work
with Washington to reform the visa system so that Korean firms can more easily
employ technical personnel from Korea. Both governments have already launched
the “Korea–U.S. Business Visit and Visa Working
Group” and agreed on permitted activities under the B-1 or ESTA categories in
its first meeting on September 30.[4] Still,
this is not a fundamental solution for dispatching skilled Korean workers to
construct and operate U.S.-based production facilities. The H-1B (specialty
occupation) visa or another type of more stable and relatively long-term visa
should be guaranteed for Korean workers.
Given that Trump’s top priority is
boosting domestic employment, the task of securing visas for Korean workers
will not be easy. However, inaction is not an option. Korea must emphasize that
its investment in the U.S. also benefits American workers when technical
expertise and capital move together. One feasible approach might be to link the
number of skilled-worker visas to the amount of investment — for example,
granting a certain number of visas per specified level of investment. The EU
and Japan, both of which have pledged large-scale investments in their trade
agreements, would also have an incentive to support such a proposal.
In addition, leveraging multilateral
platforms like the upcoming APEC Summit in Gyeongju, Korea — where
“strengthening connectivity through human exchange” is a core theme — could
help advance this agenda. The APEC Business Travel Card (ABTC), which facilitates
short-term business travel of up to 90 days, is already in operation (with
partial participation by the United States and Canada). One possible option
would be to expand this program to include skilled professionals or to
establish a new, investment-linked system modeled on it. If Korea can secure an
arrangement linking investment facilitation with visa flexibility, it would
significantly reduce uncertainty for Korean businesses and reaffirm the
alliance’s strategic and economic value.
The world is undergoing a profound
restructuring of the global economy. The case of the immigration raid on
Georgia’s Korean battery plants underscores the importance of building a
fairer, more cooperative framework for the trade–investment–immigration nexus
among allies. It is time for both governments to act with foresight and mutual
respect.
[1] Autor, D. H., Dorn, D., & Hanson, G. H. (2016). The China
shock: Learning from labor-market adjustment to large changes in trade. Annual
Review of Economics, 8(1), 205-240.
[2] Autor, D., Dorn, D., Hanson, G. H., Jones, M. R., & Setzler, B.
(2025). Places versus people: the ins and outs of labor market adjustment to
globalization (No. w33424). National Bureau of Economic Research.
Dr. Young-ook Jang is a research fellow at North America and Europe Team of the Korea Institute for International Economic Policy (KIEP). He obtained a PhD in Economic History from the London School of Economics and Political Science in 2019 and continued his research at KIEP in areas such as migration and the labor market, with a particular emphasis on North America and Europe.