US Immigration Policy
Trade-Investment-Immigration Nexus in Action: Case of U.S. Immigration Raid on Korean Plant
By Young-ook Jang
North America and Europe Team, KIEP
October 18, 2025
  • #South Korea

Key Takeaways

- The U.S. immigration raid on Korean plants in Georgia exposed deep flaws in the visa system, which fails to accommodate Korean companies’ need for skilled workers, leading to reliance on informal labor practices and straining the Korea–U.S. alliance.

- The raid reflects broader shifts in the global economic order, where the Trump administration’s policies link trade, investment, and immigration control to protect domestic manufacturing and satisfy its working-class base.

- Korea must work with the U.S. to reform visa systems and establish institutional mechanisms — potentially linking visas to investment or expanding programs like the APEC Business Travel Card — to ensure stable labor mobility and safeguard future cooperation.





 

U.S. Immigration Raid on Korean Plants in Georgia

 

In September 2025, an unprecedented immigration raid unfolded at a Korean plant in Georgia, resulting in more than 300 Korean nationals being arrested and detained by U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE). Although most of the detainees were brought home within two weeks thanks to the Korean government’s swift response, the incident caused serious disruptions to the overseas construction projects of the affected Korean companies. The Korea–U.S. relationship was also put to the test by this event.

 

There had indeed been a practice of Korean companies dispatching employees to the U.S. through informal or even illegal means. It is challenging for Korean companies to hire American workers with the necessary skills for local plant construction and operations at reasonable wages. Sending Korean workers instead, however, also faces institutional barriers. While large corporations can sometimes secure E-2 (Treaty Investor and employee) or L-1 (Intracompany Transferee) visas for executives or senior engineers, it is extremely difficult for short-term personnel from subcontracting companies to obtain proper visas. As a result, many Korean firms have resorted to sending Koreans who enter the U.S. on short-term business visas (B-1) or under the Visa Waiver Program (ESTA). Although this practice arose because the U.S. work-visa system does not fully reflect corporate labor needs, the risk of these employees falling into illegal status remained unresolved.

 

Despite this, the recent U.S. immigration raid is still an unjustifiable overreach that disregards the long-standing alliance between Korea and the U.S. Among the over 300 detainees, some individuals were staying in the U.S. with legitimate visas. Moreover, the random and inhumane arrests and detentions of Korean nationals cannot be justified under any circumstances. Furthermore, foreign investment in the U.S. will inevitably be discouraged if companies cannot secure the skilled workers they need. Georgia had become a focal point for Korean automakers’ large-scale investments in the U.S. The immigration raid not only shook investor confidence but also caused serious delays in factory construction and operations. Above all, this incident revealed a lack of respect for the Korea–U.S. alliance. Such actions risk undermining decades of mutual trust and cooperation built on shared democratic values and economic partnership.

 

It must also be recognized that there have been very few legitimate legal pathways for Korean firms to send skilled workers to the U.S., as described above. These institutional shortcomings have been filled by informal practices, which cannot be characterized as deliberate wrongdoing. If the U.S. seeks to correct these practices, it must first establish a proper institutional framework to support lawful labor mobility rather than arresting Korean workers.

 


Changing Global Economic Order as the Background of the Immigration Raid

 

Trump’s decision to target Korean (or any foreign) workers is closely tied to recent shifts in the global economic landscape. The interaction between trade, investment, labor, and immigration is rewriting the old rules of free trade.

 

The starting point is trade. Since China emerged as the world’s factory in the 1990s, U.S. manufacturing jobs have rapidly declined. Free-trade economists believed that workers displaced by import competition would relocate to other regions or industries and earn higher incomes. However, MIT economist David Autor and his co-authors refuted this idea through empirical analysis. Regions more exposed to Chinese import competition suffered greater economic harm, and manufacturing workers in those areas failed to move into higher-value industries, experiencing lasting income losses.[1] The authors called this phenomenon the “China Shock.”

 

n a more recent study, the same authors added immigration to the context. The initial employment shock from import competition was mostly offset by the mid-2010s as non-manufacturing jobs rebounded. However, this recovery mainly benefited newly arrived, higher-educated immigrants rather than native-born white workers.[2] Immigrant entry into the labor market suppressed wage growth for low-skilled native workers. The white working class was among the groups that experienced the greatest compounded shock — trade losses amplified by immigration.

 

The Trump administration’s attempt to address this challenge consists of two elements. The first is tariff imposition. Regardless of their effectiveness, reducing trade itself is a natural political reaction aimed at reversing manufacturing job losses. The U.S. began to impose a unilateral “reciprocal tariff” on August 7, 2025, with tariff rates determined through negotiations with dozens of countries. Jamieson Greer, the U.S. Trade Representative, referred to this series of negotiations as the “Trump Round in his New York Times essay titled “Why We Remade the Global Order.”[3] Moreover, tariffs have increasingly become intertwined with a wide range of issues — from foreign investment and national security to the promotion of American-made products. In its drive to protect domestic manufacturing, the administration has shown a willingness to sacrifice some price stability and even economic growth.

 

Yet trade policy alone is not sufficient. As long as immigrants continue to enter, the economic situation of Trump’s working-class base cannot improve. His second prescription enters here: restricting immigration. The first targets are undocumented immigrants. Sectors such as agriculture and construction depend heavily on them, with about 15% of the total workforce in those industries. From Trump’s perspective, a large-scale immigration crackdown both enforces the law and satisfies his core supporters. Also, if the massive foreign investment he secured through trade negotiations fails to translate into domestic job creation, his administration risks losing face. The current immigration enforcement, therefore, should be seen as a strong warning: “If you invest in America, you must hire Americans.”

 


The Remaining Task of the Korean Government

 

The Korean government managed to repatriate the detained workers swiftly, but larger challenges remain. The immediate priority is to support proper visa issuance for Korean companies that have invested in the U.S., especially taking extra care of subcontractors who were hit the hardest this time. In parallel, the Korean government should work with Washington to reform the visa system so that Korean firms can more easily employ technical personnel from Korea. Both governments have already launched the “KoreaU.S. Business Visit and Visa Working Group” and agreed on permitted activities under the B-1 or ESTA categories in its first meeting on September 30.[4] Still, this is not a fundamental solution for dispatching skilled Korean workers to construct and operate U.S.-based production facilities. The H-1B (specialty occupation) visa or another type of more stable and relatively long-term visa should be guaranteed for Korean workers.

 

Given that Trump’s top priority is boosting domestic employment, the task of securing visas for Korean workers will not be easy. However, inaction is not an option. Korea must emphasize that its investment in the U.S. also benefits American workers when technical expertise and capital move together. One feasible approach might be to link the number of skilled-worker visas to the amount of investment — for example, granting a certain number of visas per specified level of investment. The EU and Japan, both of which have pledged large-scale investments in their trade agreements, would also have an incentive to support such a proposal.

 

In addition, leveraging multilateral platforms like the upcoming APEC Summit in Gyeongju, Korea — where “strengthening connectivity through human exchange” is a core theme — could help advance this agenda. The APEC Business Travel Card (ABTC), which facilitates short-term business travel of up to 90 days, is already in operation (with partial participation by the United States and Canada). One possible option would be to expand this program to include skilled professionals or to establish a new, investment-linked system modeled on it. If Korea can secure an arrangement linking investment facilitation with visa flexibility, it would significantly reduce uncertainty for Korean businesses and reaffirm the alliance’s strategic and economic value.

 

The world is undergoing a profound restructuring of the global economy. The case of the immigration raid on Georgia’s Korean battery plants underscores the importance of building a fairer, more cooperative framework for the trade–investment–immigration nexus among allies. It is time for both governments to act with foresight and mutual respect.



[1] Autor, D. H., Dorn, D., & Hanson, G. H. (2016). The China shock: Learning from labor-market adjustment to large changes in trade. Annual Review of Economics, 8(1), 205-240.

[2] Autor, D., Dorn, D., Hanson, G. H., Jones, M. R., & Setzler, B. (2025). Places versus people: the ins and outs of labor market adjustment to globalization (No. w33424). National Bureau of Economic Research.


Dr. Young-ook Jang is a research fellow at North America and Europe Team of the Korea Institute for International Economic Policy (KIEP). He obtained a PhD in Economic History from the London School of Economics and Political Science in 2019 and continued his research at KIEP in areas such as migration and the labor market, with a particular emphasis on North America and Europe.

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