APEC 2025
ROK-China Relations after 2025 Gyeongju APEC
By Hankwon Kim
Professor, Korea National Diplomatic Academy
December 10, 2025
  • #China
  • #South Korea

Key Takeaways:
- Historical Context and Current Status: After evolving through periods of development and conflict triggered by the 2016 THAAD controversy, South Korea and China are currently attempting to cautiously re-establish relations despite the complexities of intensifying U.S.-China strategic competition. 

- Structural Challenges: The relationship faces deepening structural hurdles across all sectors, including a shift from economic complementarity to direct competition, widening political value gaps, and opposing security stances regarding the ROK-U.S. alliance and North Korea. 

- Significance of the 2025 Summit: The November 2025 Gyeongju Summit marked a potential turning point with President Xi’s "four proposals" effectively signaling the end of the conflict period, though successful re-establishment hinges on operationalizing these goals ahead of the 2026 Shenzhen APEC meeting.






1. Historical Background and Current Situation of ROK-China Relations

Following the official establishment of diplomatic ties in August 1992, South Korea (ROK: Republic of Korea)-China (PRC: the People's Republic of China) relations went through a Period of Development (1992–2000) and an Adjustment Period (2000–2016). The relationship subsequently entered a Period of Conflict following the controversy over the deployment of the Terminal High Altitude Area Defense (THAAD) system in July 2016, and is currently in a phase of re-establishing Korea-China relations.


During the Adjustment Period, conflicts occasionally arose due to major and minor trade frictions and differences in historical perception. Yet, both countries consistently sought to manage these issues through dialogue, striving to preserve the fundamental framework of their cooperative relationship. In contrast, during the Period of Conflict, both countries stood in opposition, unwilling to concede their respective core positions and national interests.


Sharing the understanding that a prolonged Period of Conflict would not serve the national interests of either country, South Korea and China cautiously began to consider re-establishing their relationship. However, building a genuine re-establishment of relations based on substantive improvement and mutual advancement of national interests is not an easy task. Since ROK-PRC relations entered the Period of Conflict, the international environment has witnessed an intensifying U.S.-China strategic competition, while the ROK-PRC relationship itself has accumulated structural challenges across critical sectors, including politics and diplomacy, military and security, economy and trade, and socio-cultural exchanges.


2. Structural Challenges in ROK-China Relations Amid U.S.-China Strategic Competition


2-1. Political and Diplomatic Domain

Challenges related to values and political systems are increasing in the political and diplomatic domain of Korea-China relations. Although clear differences in values and systems existed at the time of diplomatic normalization in 1992, they were not recognized as significant challenges to the relationship. However, as the US-China strategic competition has intensified, universal values such as human rights and democracy, political and social systems, and the resulting differences in identity between the people of the two nations have gradually emerged as new challenges in ROK-China relations.

 

2-2. Economic and Trade Domain

Due to changes in the industrial structures of both Korea and China and the deepening US-China strategic competition, a trend of increasing challenges and shrinking cooperation space has appeared in the economic and trade sectors between the two countries. As the industrial structures of Korea and China evolved, the number of competing industries between the two nations grew. Consequently, the Korea-China economic and trade relationship has transitioned from one of 'mutual complementarity and cooperation' to one of 'competition.'


Furthermore, under the framework of US-China strategic competition, the United States has continuously intensified its restraint and pressure on China's advanced science, technology, and industries. In this process, the space for Korea-China cooperation in high-tech industries, including semiconductors—a key South Korean export item to China—has continued to shrink.

 

2-3. Military and Security Domain

As a divided nation that continually faces nuclear and missile threats from North Korea, South Korea has pursued an expansion of cooperation with China based on the ROK-US alliance for the stability and peace of the Korean Peninsula. Recently, South Korea has especially strived to enhance deterrence against North Korea through the strengthening of the ROK-US alliance and ROK-US-Japan cooperation. Simultaneously, South Korea has long expected China to play a constructive role in the denuclearization and stabilization of the Korean Peninsula.


In contrast, China has expressed concern that the strengthening of the ROK-US and US-Japan alliances, as well as the expansion of ROK-US-Japan cooperation in Northeast Asia, is escalating military and security tensions. From China's perspective, ROK-US-Japan cooperation is perceived as an American strategic mechanism designed ultimately to pressure China in the region, going beyond mere deterrence against North Korea. Moreover, with the recent expansion of North Korea-Russia cooperation and the process of China improving its North Korea-China relations, references to the denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula have decreased. This has gradually lowered South Korea's expectations for a constructive Chinese role in peninsular denuclearization.

 

2-4. Socio-Cultural Exchanges Domain

Socio-cultural exchanges between Korea and China rapidly decreased when the bilateral relationship entered the Period of Conflict in 2016 and have not yet fully recovered, having also been impacted by the COVID-19 pandemic. Furthermore, a series of cultural controversies—involving issues like the Dano Festival, Hanbok, and Kimchi—have occurred between the citizens of the two countries. This has continuously led to lower the favorability of the respective countries among their citizens.

3. The Significance of the 2025 Gyeongju ROK-China Summit

The ROK-China Summit, held on November 1st, 2025, on the occasion of the APEC Leaders’ Meeting in Gyeongju, carried significant implications for the relationship between the two nations. Notably, President Xi Jinping himself mentioned "four proposals on opening up new prospects for China-ROK relations" during the meeting. This can be interpreted as an official declaration by President Xi Jinping, signaling to the Chinese authorities that they can commence a cooperation relationship with South Korea.


The four proposals by President Xi, officially released through the Chinese Ministry of Foreign Affairs, are: First, Strengthen strategic communication and consolidate the foundation of mutual trust; Second, Deepen mutually beneficial cooperation and tighten the bonds of interests; Third, Strengthen the friendship between the two peoples and bring their hearts closer together; Fourth, Enhance coordination in multilateral fora to jointly promote peace and development.


The future prospects of the ROK-China relationship depend on how effectively the structural challenges between the two countries in various sectors can be resolved or managed, based on President Xi's four proposals. Regarding the first proposal (Strategic Communication), the key is maintaining a regular high-level strategic dialogue channel between the ROK and China. During periods of conflict, when friction points arose, the absence of a functioning strategic dialogue channel caused the loss of the 'golden time' for problem resolution, leading instead to unnecessary misunderstandings and escalated conflict.


Regarding the second proposal (Mutually Beneficial Cooperation), there is a need to accelerate the second phase of the ROK-China FTA negotiations to establish a new framework for economic cooperation in sectors such as medical/healthcare, beauty, environment, and the silver industry. Furthermore, it is necessary to establish a new ROK-China economic consultative body to discuss the stability of industrial supply chains between the two countries and joint entry into the Global South.


Based on the third proposal (People-to-People Friendship), there is a need to strengthen exchanges between ROK-China youth and next-generation leaders through long-term policy management, and expand exchanges focusing on traditional Asian culture.


Finally, for the fourth proposal (Multilateral Coordination), there is a need for joint cooperation on shared interests in the international arena, particularly in multilateral diplomatic forums.

 

4. The Conclusion and Future Outlook

Consequently, the 2025 ROK-China Summit in Gyeongju held the significance of publicly announcing to both domestic and international audiences that the period of conflict in the ROK-China relationship had ended, and discussions between the two leaders for the re-establishment of ROK-China relations had begun. In fact, immediately after the summit, there was an exchange ceremony for the currency swap agreement signed between the central banks of the two countries and six Memoranda of Understanding (MOUs), aimed at materializing the practical cooperation initiatives discussed between the two leaders.


However, the re-establishment of ROK-China relations remains a challenging task. Within the context of the deepening US-China strategic competition, South Korea requires a firm ROK-US alliance for deterring North Korea.. Furthermore, amid the deteriorating China-Japan relationship following the Japanese Prime Minister Takaichi Sanae's remarks regarding Taiwan, South Korea also requires ROK-US-Japan cooperation.


Therefore, to re-establish the ROK-China relationship, the two nations must continue discussions to operationalize President Xi's four proposals through various high-level strategic dialogues and bridge their differences. The outcome of the re-establishment of ROK-China relations is expected to hinge upon whether the two supreme leaders can reach a policy decision during the ROK-China Summit to be held on the occasion of the 2026 APEC Leaders’ Meeting in Shenzhen, China.

Dr. KIM, Hankwon is an associate professor of the Department of Indo-Pacific Studies and the director of Center for Chinese Studies at Institute of Foreign Affairs and National Security (IFANS), Korea National Diplomatic Academy (KNDA), MOFA. Before joining KNDA, Dr. Kim completed a postdoctoral program at Tsinghua University, China, then worked as a research fellow and the director of the Center for Regional Studies and the Center for China Studies at the Asan Institute for Policy Studies in Seoul, South Korea. Dr. Kim received his B.A. (political science) and M.P.A. from the University of Connecticut at Storrs, USA. He holds a Ph.D. in International Relations from American University, USA. He is co-author of U.S.-China Strategic Competition (Seoul: Paper Road, 2020). He has also published articles in several academic books and journals, including "The Theory of Active Buffer States and the Evolution of North Korea-China Relations" Korea and International Politics Vol. 41, No. 1 (2025, Spring. KCI): "The 30 Years of ROK-PRC Foreign Relations" Review of International and Area Studies Vol. 31, No. 2 (2022, Summer. KCI); “Evaluating China’s Soft Power: Dimensions of Norms and Attraction” in Assessing China’s Power Ed by Jae Ho Chung (Palgrave Macmillan, 2015).

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