Key Takeaways:
- Trump’s potential 2026 meeting with Kim Jong Un—either en route from Beijing in April or at the Shenzhen APEC Summit—could reopen diplomatic space after a year of stalled U.S.–DPRK engagement and rising North Korean alignment with Russia and China.

- Although denuclearization is off the table, Trump could still pursue a historic peace declaration among the Korean War belligerents, creating a framework for arms control, limited nuclear caps, and broader normalization.

- With North Korea increasingly wary of dependence on Beijing and Moscow, Seoul may ultimately be Kim’s most reliable long-term partner—giving Trump a narrow window to reshape Korean Peninsula dynamics before U.S. political constraints tighten after late 2026.

President Trump did not meet Kim Jong Un last October after his summit with China’s President Xi Jinping in South Korea. Both Trump and Kim likely wanted to avoid upstaging the summit with Xi at that time. However, in April 2026 Trump will make a state visit to Beijing and has the opportunity to meet Kim on the way home. Trump may also attend November’s APEC Summit in Shenzhen, China - another opportunity to meet the North Korean leader. But Kim could also sense that Trump, based on their 2018-19 experience and current lack of clarity in U.S. North Korea policy, is less reliable than Putin or Xi, and may not respond to pleas by the Trump administration to meet next year.

It was unrealistic to expect that either Trump or Kim would have scheduled an October meeting on the heels of Trump’s first summit in his second term with Xi. Kim, especially, was likely highly sensitive to any appearance of distracting from the importance of Trump’s summit with Xi, especially after Kim attended the Sept. 3 victory parade in Beijing.

At the same time, efforts by the second Trump administration to reach out to North Korea have been reportedly rebuffed with an apparent lack of any engagement. It may be that Kim Jong Un has no reason to meet Trump again, unless Trump states his willingness to, in some way, recognize North Korea as indeed a nuclear power. In late 2025, it does not appear Trump is willing to make such an acknowledgment, for many reasons.

Throughout the first year of his second term, Trump has endeavored to be seen as not just a dealmaker, but as a peacemaker, claiming he has brokered peace in at least eight different geographical conflicts, and repeatedly argues he deserves the Nobel Peace Prize.

It remains to be seen whether he can bring about a lasting ceasefire and settlement in the war in Ukraine and whether that would endanger NATO members bordering Russia. In the war in Gaza, Trump successfully brokered a ceasefire with the support of over 20 world leaders in Egypt, albeit a ceasefire in which Israel retained the leeway to interpret it in ways it sees fit. Nonetheless, nearly all Israeli hostages or their remains have been returned to Israel, and possibly later this month a new phase focusing on establishing Palestinian governance in Gaza may commence.

It's debatable how effective Trump is at brokering settlements and peace agreements overall in international conflicts. Moreover, despite meeting Kim Jong Un three times in his first term, Trump finds a wholly different situation in his second term, where North Korea’s nuclear deterrent is considerably bolstered while his military alliance with Russia seems to take precedence over his relations with any other country, including China.

One trait Trump displays is an ability to think out of the box in a way no other U.S. president would likely have been able to consider. A good example is that Trump has embraced Syria’s new interim president, Ahmed al-Sharaa, whose fighters a year ago unexpectedly drove out the previous leader, Bashir Assad, to eliminate a family regime that had ruled Syria for 54 years. Trump has embraced al-Sharaa, despite his background as a former Al-Qaeda operative, which has created a new beginning for Syria. Just weeks ago, al-Sharaa made an official visit to the White House after Trump first met him earlier this year in Saudi Arabia.

What this suggests is that in certain situations Trump not only sees self-interested business opportunities but, in some situations, also is unafraid to recognize the underlying and core problem to be solved. In the case of the division of Korea, it’s possible that, to some extent, Trump senses that the underlying causes of long-standing tensions on the Korean Peninsula, which have lingered since the 1953 armistice, can only be solved by setting in motion a process of declaring peace on the Korean Peninsula that could end the technical state of war that has persisted since 1950.

It's quite likely there is no way Trump can get Kim Jong Un to denuclearize at this juncture in 2025-26. But if he can more broadly get Kim Jong Un to agree to a historical document that could also be signed by South Korean President Lee Jae Myung, as well as by Trump and China’s President Xi (the belligerents in the Korean War), as well as be endorsed by Russian President Putin, then Trump can achieve something historic. In the specifics of that document, arms control provisions can be outlined, and perhaps some sort of cap can be put on North Korea’s nuclear program, as part of wider arms control measures.

Cleary, Kim Jong Un is now seeking to become accepted as a normal member of the international community, albeit one in which the North will maintain nuclear weapons for self-defense given it claims it faces a hostile regional environment. But North Korea has sought normal international relations with neighboring regions, such as Southeast Asia, and nothing would be more dramatic for Kim than finally to normalize relations with the United States so the long-held goal for mutual cross-recognition of both Koreas by the major powers can finally take place.

There’s a deeper level that could be recognized in North Korea’s current predicament. The DPRK has long held that all of the major powers surrounding Korea are imperialistic, but the United States is seen as the more benign of the imperialistic regional powers. In the end, it remains necessary for North Korea to normalize relations with the United States to offset the enormous pressure it feels from China, which would prefer to integrate North Korea’s economy into that of China’s northeast and make the DPRK more dependent, reducing North Korea’s sovereignty and independence. Moreover, Kim knows the day will inevitably come when Putin’s Russia simply walks away from North Korea and pretends the recent years of friendly and productive relations are a thing of the past.

In the end, North Korea will be left with a stark choice: it cannot depend on China alone, which retains hegemonic ambitions towards North Korea; and it cannot depend on Russia, which is never reluctant to throw an erstwhile ally under the bus when convenient. Increasingly, Kim Jong Un must be concluding that the most reliable ally in Northeast Asia may well be its own neighbor, South Korea.

This does not mean Kim needs to alter his recent characterization of South Korea as just another country in the region that is not part of Korea as he defines it. But it does mean that, in the end, the most dependable long-term ally may in fact be a strong South Korea willing to engage in increasingly cooperative activities and exchanges with the North while acknowledging North Korea’s independence and sovereignty as a state in the international system. Underpinning that relationship would be the DPRK’s acceptance that its most reliable ally are the Korean people in the South.

The best contribution President Trump can make in Northeast Asia is to solve the problem of the division of Korea that led to the Korean War, and the Armistice that persists far longer than ever intended. Trump should lay the groundwork for the end of the technical state of war on the peninsula and lay the basis for the beginnings of cooperation that he himself can preside over.

Whatever we may think of President Trump, it should be acknowledged that as the head of the world’s leading economy and most powerful military, he retains the power to convene, to persuade, and to seal deals with the full authority of the United States. If Trump indeed has a fundamental understanding of the core problem that has led to 80 years of division of the Korean people, then that implies no future U.S. president may be able to enact the changes that history requires at this time.

Next April may be the optimal time to make this happen, especially if President Lee can meet first with China’s President Xi, and if there is meaningful progress in halting the war in Ukraine. April may create a historical opportunity for out of the box diplomacy, that may not unfold in a straight line at the onset but still lay the foundation to bear fruit in the months and years to follow. After the November 2026 U.S. midterm elections, it may no longer be possible for President Trump to put the requisite attention to the Korean issue as he can in the period through October 2026.