Key Takeaways:

-Prime Minister Sanae Takaichi has defied early expectations by delivering a highly successful diplomatic debut and securing one of the strongest initial approval ratings in Japan’s postwar history—especially among women and younger voters.

- Her administration mirrors key features of the Abe era: a revitalized conservative policy team, accelerated defense and intelligence reforms, and a sharpened FOIP-aligned diplomatic posture that signals firmness toward China without overt provocation.

- As Japan’s security environment deteriorates and China intensifies pressure, public sentiment has shifted rightward, weakening the opposition and strengthening Takaichi’s prospects—potentially setting the stage for a durable, long-term administration.

Prime Minister Takaichi achieved an 80% approval rating and got off to a flying start

After Sanae Takaichi assumed the position of Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) President on October 4, she secured a majority in the parliamentary vote for Prime Minister through a coalition with the Japan Innovation Party (Ishin) and was appointed the 104th Prime Minister of Japan on October 21. Although many initially predicted that her cabinet would be short-lived, once the administration began operating in earnest, she achieved the third-highest approval rating among newly appointed Prime Ministers since 2001. A detailed breakdown of this approval reveals that it is notably higher among women than men, particularly among young women. Considering that the LDP’s overall approval rating rose only slightly to 30%, support appears to be emerging specifically for Prime Minister Takaichi as an individual.

The background to these high approval ratings lies not only in Prime Minister Takaichi’s own personality winning public favor but also in her successful execution of bilateral summit meetings, such as the Japan–Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) Summit she attended shortly after taking office, the Japan–U.S. summit meeting with President Trump in Tokyo, and the Japan–South Korea and Japan–China summits at the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation meeting in Gyeongju, South Korea. Her diplomatic approach, particularly at the Japan–ASEAN meeting, focused heavily on the Free and Open Indo-Pacific Strategy, or FOIP, proposed by Prime Minister Abe in August 2016.

She has made some telling statements at her various appearances without explicitly naming China.  1) In the East China Sea, activities infringing upon Japan's sovereignty and provocative military activities continue and are intensifying. In the South China Sea as well, militarization and intimidating activities continue and are intensifying, causing serious concern. 2) Unjust maritime claims and activities not based on the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea cannot be accepted. Japan consistently supports the rule of law at sea and reaffirms the importance of peaceful dispute resolution based on international law. 3) Peace and stability in the Taiwan Strait are also critical issues directly linked to regional security[1].

Reappearance of key players who supported the Abe administration

The Takaichi administration saw personnel appointments made largely as rewards for service, centered around the Aso faction led by former Prime Minister Taro Aso, who played a crucial role in the LDP leadership election. Notably, key positions within the Prime Minister’s Office from his own inner circle included Naoya Imai, formerly of the Ministry of Economy, Trade and Industry, who served as Secretary and Advisor for former Prime Minister Shinzo Abe, appointed Special Advisor to the Cabinet; Takeo Akiba, who also served in the Abe administration as Vice-Minister for Foreign Affairs, appointed Special Advisor to the Cabinet; and Kazuo Masuda, who retired as Vice- Minister of Defense in August this year, appointed Deputy Chief Cabinet Secretary for Crisis Management, a role traditionally held by officials only from the National Police Agency.

Moreover, the government explicitly stated its intention to establish an intelligence agency, a concept that had previously surfaced and faded repeatedly, and has begun moving toward creating a National Intelligence Agency by July 2026. The National Security Bureau, expected to be headed by a former National Police Agency official and that will be on equal footing with the National Security Secretariat (NSS), has already appointed Keiichi Ichikawa, a former Foreign Ministry official, Secretary-General of the NSS. This effectively divides the three key posts involved in Japan’s foreign and security policy—Foreign Affairs, Defense, and Police—in a balanced manner.

Backed by Prime Minister Takaichi’s high approval ratings, both politicians and bureaucrats have regained their energy, and institutional reforms such as defense equipment transfers and defense industry development are being pushed forward at a rapid pace because of the deteriorating security environment around Japan; the withdrawal of the New Komeito from the coalition has removed the obstacles hindering institutional reform.

Public perception of threats amid deteriorating security environment surrounding Japan

In the House of Councilors (Sangiin: the Upper House) election held this July, centrist-conservative parties such as the Democratic Party for the People and hardline conservative parties such as Sanseito made significant gains, leading to the LDP’s defeat as it failed to secure an absolute majority. The Constitutional Democratic Party of Japan (CDP), the largest opposition party that should have become the receptacle for public support in place of the defeated LDP, also lost seats, resulting in a de facto defeat.

While many voters expressed distrust in the LDP, the deteriorating security environment surrounding Japan appears to have shifted public perceptions of security. This has sharpened the view that the left-leaning CDP cannot be entrusted with governance. In this context, changes are emerging within the CDP itself. Former Chief Cabinet Secretary Yukio Edano, who had led the charge in declaring the “Peace and Security Legislation” enacted by the second Abe administration—which partially permits the exercise of collective defense—unconstitutional, now argues it is constitutional. This has started to polarize opinion within the party. For the CDP, aiming for a change in government, the leadership is signaling a more conservative stance to demonstrate its ability to formulate and execute realistic national security policies. However, this has begun to create significant internal divisions within the party.

Meanwhile, Prime Minister Takaichi drew China’s ire by posting photos on social media showing her posing for a commemorative photo with Taiwan’s representative at the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation. Furthermore, the Chinese government reacted fiercely to Prime Minister Takaichi’s remarks during a Diet session regarding a potential Taiwan contingency, swiftly imposing a ban on imports of Japanese seafood products and urging its citizens to refrain from traveling to Japan.

Militarily, the escalation ladder has been creeping upward. Over a hundred Chinese naval and coast guard vessels have been deployed in waters stretching from the southern Yellow Sea to the East China Sea, South China Sea, and Pacific Ocean, primarily around the First Island Chain. Additionally, Chinese Air Force fighter jets have locked their radars onto Japanese Air Self-Defense Force fighters. However, the more forcefully China responds toward Japan, the more it continues to provide a tailwind for Prime Minister Takaichi if economic activities between Japan and China are no longer hindered and are nearly back to normal.

The longer the standoff between Japan and China persists, the more stable the Takaichi administration’s approval ratings become. If Japan refuses to compromise at all and China ultimately backs down, a long-term administration may well be within sight.