Key Takeaways:

- Treaty Suspension as a Turning Point: India’s suspension of the Indus Water Treaty (IWT) following a terrorist attack highlights how water, while rarely a direct cause of war, acts as a "threat multiplier" in politically fragile regions. The move underscores the treaty's vulnerability to broader geopolitical tensions. 

- An Obsolete Framework: The 1960 agreement is increasingly viewed as outdated, as it lacks mechanisms to address modern challenges like climate change, severe flooding, and groundwater depletion. Its rigid division of rivers prevents the holistic, ecological management needed for the region's changing environment. 

- Opportunity for Modernization: Rather than signaling inevitable conflict, the suspension offers a strategic opening to renegotiate a "future-ready" treaty. A new agreement could prioritize climate data sharing and ecological preservation, securing the basin for millions of dependents while preventing water from being weaponized in future disputes.

Water and Conflict in the Indus Water Basin

India’s suspension of the Indus Water Treaty with Pakistan, following a deadly terrorist attack against tourists in Kashmir in April 2025, has fueled an interesting and important debate on the relationship between water security and conflict. Not a new debate necessarily, but one that is especially vital in the context of South Asia; a region that holds some of the most populous countries, is one of the least integrated, has high instances of risks from climate change and numerous hotspots of tension. The suspension of the Indus Water Treaty (IWT) underscores the fragility of relationships, and also prompts a more critical understanding of the treaty itself - the need to renegotiate and upgrade a document that does not reflect the realities of the present. It also underlines how fragile water systems can be when embroiled in political conflicts. Water scarcity and/or mismanagement might not represent a genuine casus belli, but often exacerbates existing tensions and becomes a tool in larger conflicts.

Globally water has rarely been the direct cause of war but it has become embroiled in other forms of conflict and has often been used as a weapon and/or tool by both state and non-state actors. There are a total 263 international and transboundary rivers that constitute approximately 60% of the global freshwater, where close to half of these have a potential for regional or international conflict. And while there have been more instances of cooperation over shared waters than conflict since the two world wars, this is changing. Research indicates that in 2024 there were 420 instances of violent events over water, from targeting people in rural areas, to attacks on canals and dams, to cyber breaches of utilities and grids. There has been a steady rise over the last few years, with the highest cases of being water as a casualty in another form of conflict.

A multi-dimensional issue, conflict can arise as a result of a number of historical, political or socio-economic drivers and increasingly due to resource constraints and environmental drivers. The correlation between water and conflict can be perceived in two overarching ways – where the degradation of the resource can lead to a reduction in security or where a prevailing instance of conflict can harm the resource further compromising non-traditional aspects of security such as food or health. In both cases poor management and lack of cooperation between states within an accepted legal framework can increase vulnerability and risk; extremely heightened in the case of South Asia.

Signed in 1960, the IWT between India and Pakistan, brokered by the World Bank, has withstood war and cross border conflict between the two countries, and often been hailed as a success story in the larger global discourse on transboundary water. While in prevailing international relations, the IWT and 65 years of functional cooperation is considered a success, the treaty has been subject to political securitization. After months of negotiation, the governments on both sides agreed to split the 6 main rivers of the basin, with the three western rivers to be used and governed by Pakistan and three eastern rivers to be used by India, with some caveats in place. Certain restrictions were placed on India as the upper riparian, especially on storage, and use of water for irrigation, electricity generation and other activities. While no war has directly been fought between the two countries on water, there have been over the years instances of small scale tensions over water and more recently incendiary remarks by government officials on both sides of the border with respect to the river basin. After placing the treaty into abeyance, the Indian government has officially declared that it will never be restored.

From an environmental and ecological perspective, a necessary lens in a region that is constantly subject to the uncertainties and cascading risks of climate change, the treaty can be considered an obstacle to robust transboundary water management. The effects of a warming climate are being acutely felt in the region, from increasing high temperatures and heat waves to devastating floods, the likes of which Pakistan witnessed in 2022 that affected over 30 million people. There is also a record high groundwater depletion leading to a food and health crisis. A severe water crisis compounded with other effects of climate change coupled with population growth and increasing demand will further strain relations on the shared river basin. Very little of this is reflected in the treaty that has not been upgraded or amended to deal with present and future crises.

The paucity of communication and cooperation could lead to further tension between the two countries, propelled by attacks by terrorist groups and other non-state actors. While the countries are unlikely to go to a full scale war over water, the lack of an open channel of communication on the Indus could be used as a control factor or as a means to ignite hostilities.

The future of the Indus

The prevailing discourse has veered towards the assumption that the suspension of the Indus Treaty by India signifies the end of all negotiations over the river basin; and that war could be fought in the region by a combination of actors over water. In the broader South Asian context, there is also growing uncertainty regarding other water agreements and treaties, some of which are due for renewal. These include the Mahakali Treaty between India and Nepal that has been over-due for renewal since 2017 and the Ganga Agreement between India and Bangladesh due for renegotiations in 2026 (discussions on this have already begun). In a region that already ranks extremely low on regional cooperation on water and climate, a further breakdown of existing agreements and treaties could prove detrimental. There is also the looming shadow of China’s increased dam building activity on the Yarlung Tsangpo that flows into India as the Brahmaputra River.

With a number of existing fault lines in the region it is easy to assume that water will spark war in South Asia. This thinking reduces a complex region to a simple narrative that can prevent a more concerted effort, in stages, towards joint water management. It is also important to note that the suspension of the IWT does not signify its end, but an opportunity to renegotiate a treaty that does little to aid the development of communities dependant on the rivers or the long term preservation of the ecology and environment of the river itself. There have been several requests for renegotiation from India that have been rejected by Pakistan and any positive movement on starting a talks for talks on the river basin could prove beneficial. These could be relooking at certain aspects of data sharing, project-specific design audits, benchmarks and criteria for negotiations on development projects or the addition of climate related data that is currently missing.

It is important to understand where the opportunities may lie and recognise that the previous IWT had several glaring gaps that do not reflect present realities or the risks arising from climate change. It is equally vital to acknowledge that keeping a channel of communication open on shared water helps safeguard them from being used as a weapon or tool on other forms of conflict. From a hydro-ecological perspective, the IWT might not have done much to serve the river basin, it did offer a shield away from the risk of military escalation arising out of water that would be perilous for the 300 odd million directly and indirectly dependant on the basin. Urgent efforts are required to reduce the risk of water related conflict and to ensure that water does not embroiled in other sources of tension. By fronting the UN SDGs on water and sanitation both India and Pakistan can work towards negotiating and upgrading aspects of the existing treaty to one that is future ready and write a new success story for a renewed Indus Water Treaty and river basin.