Key Takeaways:

- The defining shift in 2025 was North Korea’s institutionalization of South Korea as a "principal enemy" rather than a partner for unification. This structural hostility is expected to persist through 2026, making direct inter-Korean dialogue unlikely in the short term. 

- North Korea successfully moved beyond isolation by elevating its relationship with Russia to a quasi-alliance (military/manpower exchange) while simultaneously managing its ties with China and expanding diplomatic reach to third countries like Vietnam and Belarus.

- While direct contact is blocked, the April 2026 U.S.-China summit and the potential for limited "risk management" deals between the U.S. and North Korea represent critical opportunities. South Korea must leverage these indirect diplomatic channels and its relationship with China/Russia to foster an environment conducive to crisis control.

In 2025, North Korea’s foreign policy was characterized by marked diversification amidst growing external uncertainty. Pyongyang elevated its relationship with Russia to the level of a quasi-alliance, expanding practical cooperation across military, economic, and diplomatic domains. Simultaneously, it pursued a dual track of restoration and management in its relations with China, focusing on political and economic sectors. The regime also broadened its diplomatic options by increasing engagement with third countries such as Vietnam, Laos, Indonesia, and Belarus. Conversely, while maintaining a hardline baseline stance toward the United States and South Korea, North Korea carefully managed the scope for negotiation, never fully closing the door on the possibility of summit diplomacy with Washington. Ultimately, North Korea’s external activities in 2025 did not converge on a single trajectory but rather operated as a portfolio of differing speeds and objectives tailored to specific counterparts and sectors.

Underpinning these policy drives was a structural shift in how North Korea reconfigures external relations through the lens of regime security and national interest. Notably, the transformation in its perception of inter-Korean relations continued unequivocally throughout 2025. South Korea was no longer defined as a fellow countryman but as a "principal enemy," and language regarding unification and a shared nation was marginalized in official documents and propaganda. In December 2023, North Korea redefined inter-Korean relations not as a special relationship within a nation, but as relations between two hostile states. This definition was repeated through the Supreme Leader’s discourse and reinforced as official doctrine. Consequently, inter-Korean relations in 2025 moved beyond existing frameworks, deepening into a fixed state-to-state relationship where mutual distrust and hostility became institutionalized.

This shift in perception was directly reflected in cross-border relations. The state of inter-Korean affairs in 2025 can be summarized as a phase of entrenched, managed hostility where dialogue was virtually suspended, yet all-out war was avoided. Although the South Korean government proposed measures to thaw tensions and resume dialogue—such as restoring military communication lines, reactivating military agreements, and healthcare cooperation—North Korea did not officially respond, and no official channels were opened. The prevailing view was that as long as Pyongyang adhered to its "hostile two-state" narrative, there was little likelihood of it accepting Seoul’s offers for peaceful coexistence and dialogue in the short term.

However, the absence of dialogue did not equate to an absence of crisis control. When the South Korean government suspended loudspeaker broadcasts and induced civic groups to refrain from launching leaflets in June 2025, North Korea responded the following day by halting its own anti-South broadcasts and stopping the mass launch of trash-laden balloons, a campaign that had persisted since late 2024. While Pyongyang denied this was a quid pro quo for Seoul’s actions and reaffirmed its indifference to inter-Korean dialogue, these moves were interpreted at the field level as signals of intent to manage tensions through limited reciprocal behavior. Although intermittent actions increasing the risk of accidental clashes continued in 2025, both sides demonstrated a posture of avoiding escalation into a broader military conflict.

Given these conditions, it is difficult to foresee a restoration of direct inter-Korean dialogue in the short term in 2026. It is highly probable that a structure will persist wherein political and diplomatic dialogue remains limited or suspended, while only minimal military and crisis management functions operate. If the "two-state theory" is reaffirmed or institutionally reinforced at the 9th Party Congress in February, North Korea’s incentive to officially respond to South Korean proposals may weaken further.

However, independent of this pessimistic environment, it is necessary to factor in the South Korean government’s continued proactive efforts to create an off-ramp for inter-Korean relations. In a situation where direct contact is blocked, an approach that builds conditions for crisis management and the resumption of dialogue through indirect routes becomes critical. This involves stably managing and strengthening relations with neighboring powers, including China and Russia, based on the ROK-U.S. alliance, while expanding diplomatic horizons to ASEAN nations. In other words, policy tools must be multilayered, focusing not on dragging North Korea immediately to the table, but on fostering an environment where Pyongyang feels compelled to improve relations with Seoul.

In this context, the U.S.-China summit scheduled for April 2026 in China could serve as a critical inflection point. Even if the Korean Peninsula issue does not emerge as an independent agenda item, U.S.-China summit diplomacy can provide momentum for regional tension management, crisis deterrence, and the coordination of messaging toward North Korea. Therefore, South Korea must preemptively utilize diplomatic schedules around April to open possibilities for dialogue, such as a U.S.-DPRK summit. While maintaining ROK-U.S. coordination, practical efforts are needed to activate communication channels with China to secure a minimum common denominator helpful for easing tensions and resuming dialogue. Simultaneously, relations with Russia should not be left to unilateral severance amidst the deepening DPRK-Russia alignment; rather, they should be managed by keeping open a diplomatic space that allows Russia to perceive the necessity of improving relations with South Korea. Such a multilayered approach may not change North Korea’s attitude in the short term, but it can function as a foundation to suppress accidental conflicts and secure South Korea’s policy influence when a negotiating environment is eventually formed.

Meanwhile, U.S.-DPRK relations were characterized by the coexistence of symbolic messaging and structural constraints. North Korea displayed a dualistic attitude: refusing official U.S. dialogue proposals while signaling that the personal relationship between Chairman Kim Jong Un and President Trump remained intact. Kim Yo Jong drew a line, stating that a summit could not be realized solely on personal ties, while Kim Jong Un, despite mentioning positive memories of meeting Trump, reiterated that dialogue was impossible as long as the U.S. denied North Korea’s nuclear status and made denuclearization the starting point for talks. President Trump also highlighted his personal rapport with Kim Jong Un to signal that the door to dialogue was open, but substantive negotiations did not resume because the structural gap regarding denuclearization and sanctions relief remained unresolved.

Regarding the outlook, the prevailing view is that substantive progress on denuclearization will be difficult to achieve. North Korea demands recognition as a nuclear state as a starting point, whereas the U.S. must consider alliance management, the NPT regime, and domestic political constraints. Under these conditions, realistically possible negotiations are likely to narrow down to a deal linking a freeze on nuclear and missile capabilities and some arms control measures with limited sanctions relief. Even if a summit occurs, the outcome is more likely to be limited to risk management and incremental exchange rather than complete denuclearization. However, since the realization of such a limited deal could facilitate tension reduction and the resumption of contact in some sectors, South Korea requires a strategy to coordinate U.S.-DPRK contacts around the diplomatic events of April 2026 to ensure they lead to crisis management and improved conditions for inter-Korean relations.

DPRK-Russia relations had already been elevated to an alliance level following Putin’s visit to Pyongyang in 2024, the signing of the Comprehensive Strategic Partnership Treaty, and North Korea’s deployment of troops to Russia. In 2025, this relationship deepened into a fixed structure of mutual resource exchange, interlocking the provision of shells, missiles, and manpower with energy, food, military technology, and diplomatic support via the Ukraine war. Through this, North Korea secured means to evade sanctions, accumulated experience and technology for military modernization, and gained political support on the international stage. Conversely, Russia utilized North Korea’s military production capacity and labor force to reduce the burden of a prolonged war while gaining additional leverage against the West. It is significant that the deepening of ties in 2025 exceeded initial expectations. With the Kim-Putin summit in Beijing during the September victory day celebrations, both sides reaffirmed the cooperation outlined in their treaty. Throughout the year, serial consultations between government delegations and working-level officials occurred not only in arms and military fields but also in transport, energy, agriculture, education, culture, and health. The DPRK-Russia Joint Economic Committee meeting in Pyongyang in late October discussed infrastructure development, resource and energy cooperation, and expanded human exchange as official agendas, and physical infrastructure expansion—such as the construction of the Tumen River automobile road—was pursued. A significant increase in Russian tourists to North Korea also confirmed the broadening of human exchanges.

In 2026, DPRK-Russia relations are likely to remain robust as long as the Russia-Ukraine war continues. Even if the conflict transitions to a ceasefire or armistice, cooperation is likely to persist in a different form rather than cease abruptly, given the remaining utility of North Korean labor and resources in post-war reconstruction. However, if the possibility of restoring ROK-Russia relations grows after the war ends, internal incentives may arise within Russia to adjust its exposure and burden regarding North Korea to highlight the need for economic cooperation with the South. In this sense, South Korea’s efforts to maintain a certain level of contact with Russia and keep diplomatic space open could operate as an indirect variable influencing North Korea’s attitude toward the South in the mid-to-long term.

DPRK-China relations clearly demonstrated that economics and trade do not necessarily move at the same speed as politics and diplomacy. While trade with China increased after the border reopening in 2023, growth slowed or regressed in some items in 2024, leading to speculation that economic cooperation was in a phase of adjustment or management, contrary to the amicable diplomatic atmosphere. In tourism, expectations were raised by Chinese travel agencies launching group tour products in early 2025, but the resumption was aborted just before departure, indicating that normalization in economic and tourism sectors remains limited. Nevertheless, trade growth became prominent in the second half of 2025, and meaningful progress appeared in political and diplomatic channels. Kim Jong Un’s visit to Beijing in September and Premier Li Qiang’s visit to Pyongyang in October suggest a move to re-emphasize the symbolic importance of the relationship.

As the stability of supply for various materials becomes crucial in the first year of the new 5-year economic development plan—to be announced at the 9th Party Congress in early 2026—North Korea is highly likely to actively seek trade normalization, economic support, and the resumption of tourism and logistics. China also has incentives to tolerate this recovery due to its interest in managing conflict escalation on the Peninsula and the need for economic stability in its northeastern region. However, China perceives North Korea as a difficult partner: it is simultaneously China’s largest trading partner and economic safety valve, but also a burden due to sanctions enforcement, U.S.-China competition, and the ramifications of DPRK-Russia military cooperation. Thus, a temperature difference—where the economy recovers while politics and security are strictly managed—is likely to persist. Ultimately, South Korea needs to strengthen communication with China based on ROK-U.S. coordination while identifying cooperative agendas that can induce China to engage more actively in tension reduction and crisis management on the Peninsula.

regarding third-country diplomacy, North Korea expanded its diplomatic options in 2025 through consultations with Belarus, summits with Vietnam and Laos, and foreign ministerial talks with Indonesia. In 2026, amidst efforts to minimize international isolation and present its nuclear status as a fait accompli, Pyongyang is likely to continue improving relations with Southeast Asia, Eurasia, and other developing nations. South Korea must also utilize this space. Strengthening international linkages in low-risk cooperation fields such as humanitarian aid, health, disaster relief, and the environment within the ASEAN framework or regional multilateral settings can serve as an indirect means to create an environment where North Korea can engage in dialogue, even while direct inter-Korean contact is blocked. Since the success of third-country diplomacy depends on subsequent implementation, South Korea needs to utilize these multilateral networks to accumulate norms and procedures for tension reduction on the Peninsula and secure a foundation that can transition into substantive discussions when a dialogue phase opens.

In summary, the Kim Jong Un regime in 2026 is likely to reaffirm its power and line through the 9th Party Congress, repeating the narrative of a "wealthy country with a strong military" possessing nuclear forces to maintain relative stability internally and externally. While direct inter-Korean contact remains structurally difficult and the hostile two-state relationship is likely to be maintained, this does not mean South Korea’s policy space has vanished. The more pessimistic the environment, the more South Korea must strengthen its own agency by stably managing and reinforcing relations with neighbors like China and Russia based on ROK-U.S. coordination, and expanding its diplomatic horizon to ASEAN to create conditions for crisis management and dialogue resumption through direct and indirect paths. In particular, centered around the U.S.-China summit diplomacy scheduled for April 2026, South Korea needs to concentrate on substantive diplomatic actions to manage the situation on the Peninsula and find a breakthrough for improved relations. While 2026 is likely to be a year of high uncertainty and unpredictability, the core task of foreign policy response will be the effort to manage risks and seize opportunities through multifaceted diplomacy and strategy for environment creation.