► South Korea and Europe call for inclusiveness, but only if certain values such as openness, transparency, freedom, and accountability are respected. To put it bluntly, neither South Korea nor Europe believe that China respects these values today. By definition, they have made a choice about where they stand in the US-China competition. They stand with their ally, the US.

► This shared approach of not being as explicit in criticising China, at least in public, in fact binds South Korea and Europe in a way that can reinforce security cooperation.

► Considering the many areas in which they can boost security links and their similar views and approaches to the Sino-American rivalry, Seoul and its European partners are poised to boost security cooperation.

South Korea is the only Asian country with a strategic partnership, a trade agreement, and a security cooperation agreement with the EU in place. When the EU and European countries think of potential political, economic, and security partners in Asia, South Korea along with Japan invariably top the list. For South Korea and Europe share strong capabilities, common values and interests, and the willingness to shape global affairs rather than be shaped by them. Yet, South Korea-Europe cooperation remains limited when it comes to security. It is time for this to change.

From a European perspective, it is understandable that the US remains Seoul’s undisputed preferred security partner. It is also reasonable that South Korea may want to cooperate with Japan, regardless of the state of political relations between both, strengthen relations with Australia, or increase its presence and links across Southeast Asia. But this does not exclude the possibility of stronger security relations between South Korea and Europe.

To begin with, the position and concerns that Seoul, the EU, and European countries share in the era of US-China competition are very similar. Both South Korea and Europe would rather there were no competition, and in public insist that their policy is inclusive and supportive of multilateralism.

But look beyond wishes and public statements, and the nuances of South Korean and European approaches to the Sino-American rivalry are obvious. South Korea and Europe call for inclusiveness, but only if certain values such as openness, transparency, freedom, and accountability are respected. To put it bluntly, neither South Korea nor Europe believe that China respects these values today. By definition, they have made a choice about where they stand in the US-China competition. They stand with their ally, the US.

And indeed, South Korea and Europe are partners in a potentially expanded G7, have signed up to initiatives such as the T10, and are first in line to attend Washington’s planned Summit for Democracy. Both of them have publicly shared their concerns about disruptions to freedom of navigation in the South China Sea or the Taiwan Strait. Both have suffered from cyber-attacks coming from China, North Korea, or Russia. And, whisper it, both have been embracing minilateralism such as cooperation with the Quad and joint naval exercises – or the just-mentioned expanded G7 and T10, if one doesn’t want to whisper.

So in which areas can South Korea and Europe enhance security cooperation? Maritime security, to begin with. South Korean navy officials are regularly deployed with Eunavfor, the EU’s naval force patrolling the waters of the Gulf of Aden to fight against piracy. The ROK Navy has participated in joint exercises with the British, French, German, and Spanish navies. As the EU launches its Indo-Pacific strategy and ponders whether to boost its maritime presence in the waters of the Indian Ocean, this is an area that is ripe for cooperation.

Cyber security clearly is another area where Seoul can boost engagement with Brussels and other European partners. South Korea and the EU have a regular cyber dialogue, last held in November of last year. They believe in strong global standards to ensure an open and stable cyberspace. Equally relevant, the police forces and intelligence agencies of South Korea and several European countries are engaged in cyber security cooperation. With cyber space having become a new battlefield, this is an area in which South Korea and Europe should strengthen links.

Crisis management is yet another area in which South Korea and Europe can cooperate. Both of them benefit from a stable international security environment. Both of them suffer when crises in third countries take place. The example of the chaotic withdrawal of US troops from Afghanistan and subsequent Taliban takeover of the country is a case in point. Increasingly, South Korea, the EU, and European countries encounter each other whenever a crisis occurs. Joint training, capability and expertise sharing, or joint planning should be no-brainers.

Thinking about the future, cooperation in space security would be both desirable and possible. The recent outer space security agreement between Seoul and Washington shows that South Korea is thinking ahead in this area. The EU has its own space policy, which includes a security and defence component. South Korea and Europe are among the very few actors with capabilities and expertise to consider space security cooperation seriously. Seoul should seek a security partnership with Brussels and other European capitals in this field.

In all these areas, South Korea and Europe will inevitably cooperate with the US and other like-minded partners such as Australia, Canada, or Japan. Which takes us back to the question of US-China competition. Unless Beijing radically changes its behaviour, South Korea and Europe do not have to even think about making a choice when it comes to their security partner. The choice has been made for them, with their values and interests inevitably pulling them towards the US camp.

This does not mean that South Korea and Europe are going to openly antagonise China. Both of them have been cautious to stress that the door for cooperation with Beijing remains open. None of them has the willingness or, frankly, the military strength to be as explicitly confrontational as Washington. And neither South Korea nor Europe believe that fully decoupling from China is realistic, a belief that informs their security policy. This shared approach of not being as explicit in criticising China, at least in public, in fact binds South Korea and Europe in a way that can reinforce security cooperation.

Of course, security cooperation between South Korea and Europe will not be straightforward. The ROK-US alliance logically dictates Seoul’s security cooperation preferences. And in Europe, NATO continues to be the dominant security framework. Furthermore, Northeast Asia and Europe are fundamentally different geopolitical realities. North Korea continues to dominate South Korea’s security priorities. Russia and potential instability in the Middle East and North Africa are direct threats to the European continent. And whereas both Seoul and Europe increasingly see China as a security threat, the nature of this threat is different for each of them.

But where there is a will there is a way. And for South Korea and Europe, this will has now arrived. Considering the many areas in which they can boost security links and their similar views and approaches to the Sino-American rivalry, Seoul and its European partners are poised to boost security cooperation.

Allow me to end on a personal note to support this point. I have been calling for stronger security cooperation between Europe and South Korea for well over a decade now. At times, this looked like the most futile of efforts. But over the past couple of years, the situation has dramatically changed. Policy-makers on both sides want to discuss practical ways to enhance cooperation. In Europe, defence and foreign policy officials make and action plans to boost security links with Seoul. This applies as much to the EU as to countries including France or the UK, as well as NATO. In South Korea, MOFA, the MND, and government-linked think tanks ask specific questions about how can Seoul benefit from security cooperation with Europe. This shows that they are thinking hard about this issue. In other words, we have moved beyond rhetoric. The time for action has finally arrived.