Evaluating President Yoon Suk Yeol’s Participation in the NATO Summit and ROK-China Relations

Despite concerns, Korea-China relations during the Yoon Suk Yeol administration will continue to remain stable and that the potential for conflict between the two countries is not high.

► Unless the Yoon administration tries to bring in an additional THAAD battery or declares its involvement in Taiwan affairs at a level on par with Japan, the current Korea-China relations are unlikely to deteriorate or face another diplomatic crisis similar to the THAAD incident.

 

 

The North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) Summit in Madrid, Spain was the destination of President Yoon Suk Yeol’s first overseas trip as president of the Republic of Korea (hereafter, Korea or ROK). Over the course of two days—from June 29 to 30—President Yoon completed his first diplomatic engagement after being invited as one of NATO’s Asia Pacific partners, which included leaders from Japan, Australia, and New Zealand. As announced by the National Security Office, President Yoon’s participation in the NATO Summit achieved three important tasks: solidarity of values and norms; enhanced cooperation to deal with newly emerging security threats; and establishment of a global network. His participation has been received positively because he successfully provided a roadmap for Korean diplomacy in the coming years. Specifically, President Yoon’s North Korea policy received widespread support from the international community. Moreover, his debut in the international stage provided a stepping stone to transform Korea-Japan relations—which has been deadlocked due to history issues—into a cooperative relationship.

 

President Yoon’s diplomatic achievements during the NATO Summit can be analyzed in the following aspects. First and foremost, he laid out a vision of Korea’s role as a “global pivotal state” and, thereby, provided a clear blueprint for Korean diplomacy. During his sixteen meetings with European leaders, he announced that Korea will expand its role in global affairs by strengthening solidarity of values and norms with Europe—a region that shares universal values such as liberal democracy, human rights, and rule of law among its members. Second, President Yoon fully dedicated himself to “sales diplomacy,” aimed at strengthening and expanding Korea’s economic security. He discussed greater cooperation in advanced sectors, including semiconductors, nuclear energy, batteries, bio-technology, and defense with leaders of the Czech Republic, the Netherlands, the United Kingdom, and Canada. He also promoted the expansion of global supply chains—to include Europe—and the diversification of export markets. Diversification of export markets, including the European market, appears inevitable given the slowdown of China’s economic development and the possibility that China might transition into a domestic demand-oriented economy. Third, he agreed in principle to resume ROK-US-Japan trilateral defense cooperation for the first time in five years—something that the Moon administration had avoided due to worsening Korea-Japan relations. By restarting trilateral military and security cooperation, which had been dormant for a significant period of time, President Yoon pushed for a more effective response to deal with the North Korean nuclear threat.

 

In spite of these diplomatic successes, the Yoon administration also received its fair share of criticism. Much of this criticism stems from concerns that such diplomatic initiatives could danger Korea’s relationship with China. In fact, President Yoon clearly expressed during the campaign trails that he would ‘rebuild the ROK-US alliance’ and ‘establish a future-oriented ROK-Japan relations’ while not outlining a clear policy towards China. China expressed deep concerns over the Yoon campaign’s statements about the potential deployment of additional THAAD battery and description of its China policy as ‘confident policy based on mutual respect.’ Both domestic and foreign media outlets have described the Yoon administration’s foreign policy as showing a clearly pro-American stance and, as a result, have raised concerns that this will strain Korea-China relations, especially during the period of US-China confrontation. However, given that the source of these concerns originates from certain Chinese media outlets that quote Chinese scholars to criticize the Korean government, the threatening argument that the Yoon administration’s pro-American policy will endanger Korea-China relations and incur Chinese retaliation or pressure is not grounded on reality.

 

My argument in this article is that, despite concerns, Korea-China relations during the Yoon Suk Yeol administration will continue to remain stable and that the potential for conflict between the two countries is not high. First, the Yoon administration has been expanding Korea’s diplomatic territory without crossing what China considers to be the red line. For example, the Yoon administration’s ‘110 Key National Tasks,’ announced after its inauguration, excluded the issue of THAAD. Also, this year’s ROK-US Leaders’ Joint Statement mentioned Taiwan in a manner akin to last year’s statement by Presidents Moon and Biden. By doing so, it was sending a message to China that it does not want a deterioration of Korea-China relations. From China’s perspective, THAAD and Taiwan are part of China’s core interests and, therefore, it sees Korea’s policies towards these issues as a litmus test for evaluating its relations with Korea. Fortunately, China, assessing President Yoon’s policies in a positive manner so far, is trying to maintain a stable relationship.

 

In fact, it appears that China has been intent on maintaining an amicable relations with the new government in Korea. One example can be found in Vice President Wang Qishan’s attendance at President Yoon’s inauguration. Another example is how China has refrained from launching direct criticisms or warnings whenever the Yoon administration responded positively to the US attempt to strengthen the ROK-US alliance and its request to join the US-led multilateral mechanisms. Instead, strong criticisms or warnings toward the Yoon administration have actually come from Chinese media outlets such as Huanqiu. Since articles, assessments, or op-eds published by Chinese media often do not reflect the official position of the Chinese government, it is difficult to reach a definite conclusion that Korea-China relations face an uphill battle. Doing so would actually be distorting the true intentions of the Chinese government. Much of China’s wish to maintain stable relations with the Yoon administration stems from its complicated domestic situation. Currently, the Chinese economy is undergoing a significant slowdown caused by the US-China conflict, global inflation brought on by the war in Ukraine, and its zero-Covid policy. As such, it is expected that China will want to maintain a stable relationship rather than to start a conflict with Korea. The 20th Party Congress scheduled for the second half of this year will determine whether President Xi Jinping will lead China for a record third term. This provides the Chinese leadership with another reason to maintain a stable environment at least until the end of this year.

 

Unless the Yoon administration tries to bring in an additional THAAD battery or declares its involvement in Taiwan affairs at a level on par with Japan, the current Korea-China relations are unlikely to deteriorate or face another diplomatic crisis similar to the THAAD incident. As we welcome thirty years of Korea-China relations and envision the next thirty years, I hope that the Yoon Suk Yeol administration will utilize its deep understanding of China and pursue a confident and level-headed China policy that aligns with Korea’s national interests and aims for a new type of Korea-China relations.

 

AUTHORS

Professor Han is currently assistant professor of Chinese studies at Yonsei University's GSIS. He received his political science degrees from Yonsei University and continued his graduate studies at the prominent Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy at Tufts University. His practical experience in Chinese studies was earned as a lecturer at Peking University’s School of Government and at the Chinese Academy of Social Science in Beijing. Professor Han’s area of specialization is in Chinese security and foreign policy and business practices in China.