The 2022 NATO Summit and South Korean Diplomacy

 2022 North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) Summit was held amidst the biggest security crisis since World War II mainly due to the war in Ukraine that continues to threaten peace in Europe. The summit was significant because the decisions made during the summit would shape the future of the alliance including South Korea. Even though South Korea is not a member of NATO, it was specially invited to the summit as one of NATO’s partner countries. 

 NATO adopted a new Strategic Concept, labeling Russia as “the most significant and direct threat to Allies' security and to peace and stability in the Euro-Atlantic area, and NATO declared the West’s joint response to the Russian threat. 

 Another key feature of this year’s NATO summit was that it described China’s ambitions and its “coercive policies” as posing “systemic challenges” to the Western bloc’s “interests, security, and values.” The newly adopted Strategic Concept describes China’s “malicious hybrid and cyber” threats to NATO members and warns of China’s attempts to “subvert the rules-based international order.”

 

 

 

 

On June 29, the 2022 North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) Summit took place in Madrid, Spain. This year’s summit was held amidst the biggest security crisis since World War II—mainly the war in Ukraine that continues to threaten peace in Europe. The summit was also significant, as NATO Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg pointed out because the decisions made during the summit would shape the future of the alliance. Among the attendees was South Korean President Yoon Suk Yeol. Even though South Korea is not a member of NATO, it was specially invited to the summit as one of NATO’s partner countries. For three nights and five days—from June 27 to July 1—, President Yoon visited Madrid for what can be considered his debut on a multilateral diplomatic stage. It also marked the first time that a South Korean president attended a NATO summit.

 

Given that this year’s summit took place with the Russian invasion of Ukraine firmly in the background, Russian threats were the central topic in much of the summit’s discussions. In 2010, NATO designated Russia as a strategic partner. Twelve years later, however, NATO adopted a new Strategic Concept, labeling Russia as “the most significant and direct threat to Allies' security and to peace and stability in the Euro-Atlantic area.”

 

Most importantly, NATO declared the West’s joint response to the Russian threat. Its members promised additional military as well as humanitarian aid to Ukraine. Moreover, members agreed to strengthen deterrence and defense posture, especially in the eastern flank of the alliance. The goal is to stockpile military equipment and resources and increase the strength of rapid reaction forces from 40,000 to 300,000. For example, the United States announced that it will establish a permanent base in Poland for the U.S. Army’s V Corps, position a rotational Brigade Combat Team in Romania, and strengthen rotational deployment in the Baltic. The United Kingdom has also committed an additional 1,000 military personnel and one aircraft carrier to defend Estonia.

 

The summit also witnessed progress in granting admissions for Sweden and Finland to join NATO. Against their traditions of neutrality, the two countries completely shifted gears in the aftermath of Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, applying for membership in NATO. Even though Türkiye (formerly known as Turkey) disapproved of membership of the two countries in May for supporting the Kurds, it eventually lifted its objection just prior to the summit, which led to a unanimous vote in favor of the two countries joining NATO. Over the next several months, Sweden and Finland’s memberships will be determined by NATO’s thirty members, with each member having to go through a domestic ratification process. Their memberships will drastically enhance NATO’s capability to deal with Russia. Even though Russia cited NATO’s eastward expansion as the reason for its invasion of Ukraine, the war had the unintended consequence of strengthening and expanding NATO’s influence.

 

Another key feature of this year’s NATO summit was that it described China’s ambitions and its “coercive policies” as posing “systemic challenges” to the Western bloc’s “interests, security, and values.” The newly adopted Strategic Concept describes China’s “malicious hybrid and cyber” threats to NATO members and warns of China’s attempts to “subvert the rules-based international order.” It also pointed out “the deepening strategic partnership” between China and Russia and their “mutually reinforcing attempts to undercut” NATO’s values and interests. At the same time, it made clear that NATO will “remain open to constructive engagement with the PRC, including to build reciprocal transparency.”

 

NATO extending its invitations to four Asia Pacific nations, including South Korea, as its strategic partners for the very first time can be interpreted as NATO’s effort to respond to the challenges posed by China. All four leaders from New Zealand, Japan, Australia, and Korea accepted the invitation and, during a separate meeting, they exchanged views on ways to strengthen cooperation with NATO and on Asia Pacific issues that are of common interests.

 

Unlike NATO’s agreement to strengthen defense posture in Europe, it did not agree to a specific policy action for the Indo-Pacific region. However, NATO stressed the importance of expanding cooperation to allies and partners that share the same values and interests in order to effectively deal with global challenges such as climate change, emerging technologies, arms control and reduction, and non-proliferation, among others. Many of these global challenges overlap with the “systemic challenges” posed by China.

 

The fact that NATO realized China as a major challenge and invited partners in the Asia-Pacific region to its summit shows that NATO, along with the United States, does not see Europe and the Asia-Pacific region as two distinct regions with different orders. Rather, it shows that they understand the close connectivity between the regions amid a general shift in the global order. This is significant because it serves as a prelude to the Western alliance expanding its network beyond Europe and North America. Of course, there is a long way to go to institutionalize a trans-Western alliance beyond the traditional West. However, it is undeniable that, under the leadership of the United States and with Europe's agreement, the movement in that direction has started.

 

President Yoon Suk Yeol declared during his speech that Korea will provide aid to Ukraine and added that “freedom and peace are guaranteed through solidarity with the international community … I hope the cooperative relationship between South Korea and NATO will become a cornerstone for such solidarity." He also said that he looked forward to “cooperation with NATO countries in terms of economic security, public health, cybersecurity, and emerging technologies.” By doing so, President Yoon made clear that Korea is a country that shares the same values with the West and that it will increase cooperation with NATO in the years ahead.

 

During the summit, President Yoon held bilateral meetings with leaders of Australia, the Netherlands, Poland, France, Denmark, the Czech Republic, Canada, and the United Kingdom, in addition to his meetings with the President of the European Council and the Secretary General of NATO. In his bilateral meetings with leaders of industrialized nations, he concentrated his discussions on economic and technological cooperation involving cutting-edge technologies and future industries.

 

Unfortunately, the much-anticipated South Korea-Japan summit did not take place. While both sides acknowledged the importance of improved bilateral relations, they remained cautious because premature actions could lead to political backlash. However, President Yoon met with Prime Minister Kishida on four different occasions, including the ROK-US-Japan trilateral summit which took place for the first time in five years. The trilateral summit meeting was especially important because the three leaders prioritized enhanced trilateral cooperation in the Asia Pacific, including security cooperation, to deal with the urgent issue involving North Korea’s nuclear and missile development.

 

As mentioned by NATO Secretary General Stoltenberg, this year’s NATO Summit may go down as a historic meeting. Members agreed to increase their military force to better deal with the Russian threat and laid the groundwork for a trans-Western alliance network to deal with the challenges posed by China. Following Korea’s declaration that it is a key member of this trans-Western alliance network, it will be asked to take on a more specific role in global affairs. Going beyond rhetoric, Korea will face serious challenges in responding to this demand. As such, the Korean government must prepare for a more delicate policy moving forward.

 

In response to NATO’s designation of China as a systemic challenge, the latter has criticized the former for its Cold War mentality. China has also expressed displeasure at President Yoon’s decision to attend the NATO Summit. However, it appears unlikely that China will level economic retaliation against South Korea for participating in a multilateral dialogue, especially given that the 20th National Congress of the Chinese Communist Party is set to take place in the fall. Regardless, South Korea will face the difficult task of convincing China that enhanced cooperation with NATO does not necessarily imply that it is relinquishing its pragmatic relationship with China.

 

AUTHORS

Sang-Yoon Ma is a Professor of International Relations at the Catholic University of Korea. Formerly, he was Director-General for Strategy at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Korea from September 2016 to August 2019. He also was visiting fellow at the Brookings Institution, the Wilson Center in Washington DC, and the ISDP in Stockholm. Fulfilling military service responsibilities, he worked as a ROK Air Force intelligence officer from 1989 to 1992. Professor Ma studied International Relations for his B.A. and M.A. degrees at Seoul National University. Then, as a Swire Scholar, he continued his study of International Relations at St. Antony's College, Oxford University, where he received a DPhil degree. His doctoral thesis analyzed U.S. policy toward Korea during the 1960s, focusing on the question of democracy in the country. His main areas of teaching and research include East Asian international politics, U.S. foreign policy, Korea-U.S. relations, and Cold War history.